Attitudes toward the Market and Political Participation in the Postcommunist States David S. Mason
In the aftermath of the anti-communist revolutions of 1989-1991, the new governments in eastern Europe faced the herculean task of attempting simultaneously to build market economies and democratic political institutions_ Though capitalism and democracy are often considered to be natural allies, in the cases of these new states they sometimes pull against each other. The costs of the economic transition, in terms of growing unemployment, inequality and inflation, may erode support for the new governments and lead to calls for a "strong" government or leadership to cope with economic dislocations_ To a large extent, the success of economic transitions is dependent on the continuing popularity and legitimacy of the new governments. Democratic legitimacy and stability can probably be maintained only if the governments remain broadly responsive to and representative of the populations-or at least be perceived as such. In eastern Europe the new governments seem to have established their democratic credentials through their popular overthrow of the communist regimes and through widespread support for new parties and regimes in early rounds of parliamentary elections. However, a close look at the backgrounds and attitudes of the politically active in these countries raises some questions about how closely they represent the rest of the population, particularly in terms of their attitudes towards the market and towards socialist principles.
Participation and representativeness are important aspects of democratic politics in established democracies and probably even more so in fledgling ones. In his classic theoretical work on Polyarchy, Robert Dahl emphasizes that all full citizens must have unimpaired opportunities to "signify their preferences" through individual and collective action. l And empirical studies of both the US and other western democracies have stressed the importance for democracy of the availability of channels for political activity and the extent to which such channels are differentially available and used across social groupS.2 If democracy is to work properly, people from all socio-economic groups and all political orientations should have the opportunity, at least, to participate in the political process. This paper will explore this issue in the postcommunist states by examining the level and sources of support for the market-oriented reforms in east central Europe and the former Soviet Union, and the relationship between these attitudes and the populations' political orientations and participation. Numerous recent studies have examined popular support for either democracy or the market in these states;3 most of these, however, have been single-country studies. With some exceptions (e.g. Rose; McIntosh et al.) , none have compared such attitudes across countries and fewer still have compared attitudes in the postcommunist states with those in western countries. And few have attempted, as I shall, to link economic values with political participation. 4 The present analysis is based on data collected by the International Social Justice Project (ISJP), a large-scale, common public opinion survey on social, economic and political justice implemented in 1991 in twelve countries: Russia, Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,5 Germany (former East and West), Holland, the UK, Japan and the US. 6 The focus of this paper will be on the postcommunist states, though comparisons will be made between them and the capitalist democratic states. In all of these countries, the survey was conducted in mid-1991, which was a period of considerable political and economic flux, and even of turmoil, in the postcommunist states, with dramatic declines in GNP and industrial production, high rates of inflation and rapid increases in unemployment.
I shall begin by looking at popular attitudes in the postcommunist states towards the market and towards socialism, and towards particular elements of socialist ideology, since all of these are central issues in the transition processes and political arenas in these countries. I shall then consider the scope and determinants of political participation in the postcommunist states, and the relationship of pro-and antisocialist values to political participation. Finally, I shall look at more recent evidence in Poland to explore possible trends, and as a potential explanation for the resurgence of the left in Poland and elsewhere in the second and third rounds of parliamentary elections in the region.
Attitudes towards Socialism and the Market
In the aftermath of the democratic revolutions of 1989, citizens in the postcommunist states demonstrated a remarkable ambivalence towards the theory and practice of socialism. Having just overturned the communist system, with its authoritarianism, centralization and inefficiencies, most people were hostile to the idea, at least, of socialism. When asked about their views on socialism, fewer than a quarter of respondents in each of eight postcommunist states expressed support for that path, while the overwhelming majority in each country agreed with the statement that "a free market economy is essential to our economic development" (see tables 1 and 2). Such substantial support for a new course in the economic sphere would seem to have boded a Market Economy within the Mass Culture of the USSR," paper presented at the 1993 Annual Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Stud· ies, Honolulu; Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger, "Comparing Citizen and Elite Attitudes towards a Market Economy in Russia, Ukraine and Lithu· ania," paper presented at the 1993 annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu.
5. As Estoniajoined the project late, the survey was fielded there in spring 1992. 6. In this project, national teams in each of the twelve countries were responsible for obtaining a probability sample of the adult population, the cross·validation of the measuring instrument and the implementation of a national survey with a target sample of 1500 respondents in each country. well for the transformational policies of the new governments in these countries.
Once one gets away from the ideologically loaded terms of "socialism" and "market," however, this seeming consensus begins to dis· appear. When respondents were asked more specific questions they tended to support important policies and values associated with the state socialist regimes they had left behind. This is perhaps most evident in widespread egalitarianism, support for a strong role for the government in the economy and deep skepticism about a distributive system based more on merit than on need.
The radical egalitarianism of early communism in the Soviet Union was soon replaced by a more meritocratic ideology and incentive system in the Stalin period, in both Russia and eastern Europe. Nevertheless, there remained a strong egalitarianism in the communist ide- Question: Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statement: A free market economy is essential to our economic development.
ology, and both wages and incomes were less highly differentiated in the communist countries than in western capitalist ones. 7 Surveys con· ducted in east Europe, and especially in Poland, before 1989 showed a high degree of social and economic egalitarianism in the popula· tions. 8 As the east European countries move towards free enterprise and the market, economic inequality will grow sharply as the governments relax restrictions on wages and wealth, and abandon their commitment to full employment. A major task of the new governments is to con· vince their populations to accept greater economic inequality in their societies. This may be difficult, given the prevailing attitudes. When asked about the differences in incomes in their countries, the overwhelm· ing majority in each of the east European states asserted that such differences are too large. Preferred income differences are much less in the postcommunist states than in the developed capitalist countries. Respondents in the survey were asked to postulate a '~ust and fair" income for the managing director of a large corporation and for an unskilled factory worker. In the eight postcommunist states (including the eastern part of Germany), the average ratios between these two salaries (the first divided by the second) were uniformly smaller than in capitalist states. The median postulated income differential in the capitalist states was 4.0 (the higher income should be 4 times larger than the smaller), compared to just 2.5 in the postcommunist ones.
While most people did not favor total income equality, many did. When asked about the fairest way of distributing wealth and income, 20-30 percent in each country (except Estonia) favored giving every· one equal shares. These figures may seem high for such a radically egalitarian position but the level of support for this position was sim· ilar to that of capitalist states. What postcommunist populations do favor is guaranteed jobs and, to a lesser extent, ceilings on income, imposed by government: a solution not too different than that which prevailed under the communist regimes. The preference for guaran· teed jobs was overwhelming, with from 56 to 84 percent strongly agree· ing that "the government should provide ajob for everyone who wants one." Smaller but still sizeable percentages in each country agreed (strongly or somewhat) that "the government should place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone person can make." As I shall show below, this reflects a strong preference in the east European states for governmental solutions to economic and social problems.
This strand of economic egalitarianism is linked to a popular con· ception of justice that calls for rewards to be distributed on the basis of need as much as (or more than) merit or desert. This seems to be at least partly a legacy of the communist period, when the state guar· anteed jobs and provided a whole host of entitlements, including national minimum wages and retirement benefits, heavy subsidies of food, housing, utilities and vacations, generous maternity leaves and so on_ While many east Europeans complained about shortages of consumer goods and a standard of living lower than that in the west, they also became accustomed to benefits provided by the state_ This concern about peoples' needs is indicated by substantial agreement with the proposition that "people [should] get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need_" A majority or a plurality of respondents in all the east European countries (except Bulgaria) agreed (strongly or somewhat) with this proposition. People with lower incomes were somewhat more likely to agree with this statement but support for the principle remained substantial across income groups in most cases. In Poland, for example, 66 percent of respondents in the lowest income quartile agree, and so do 48 percent of those in the top quartile.
This emphasis on need over merit is also evident in another question on which factors should influence the level of pay for an employee. When asked about "the size of the family the employee supports," a clear majority of respondents in every postcommunist country (except Czechoslovakia) felt that this should have "a great deal" or "some" influence in determining salary. The average level of support for this proposition was 57 percent in the former communist countries, compared to 48 percent in the developed capitalist countries. The highest level of support for this proposition, however, came from western Germany (73%). As I shall show, attitudes and values in the east European countries often are closer to those in western Germany, with its "social market" system, than to the other capitalist states. 9 With their revolutions, the east European countries left behind systems in which state and party dominated the economies and most other aspects of those societies. The state provided jobs and housing, set prices and wages, owned industries, schools and farms (in most countries), and subsidized basic necessities. The omnipresence and omnipotence of the state aggravated many people and contributed to revolutionary ferment. But many people also came to rely on the benefits provided by the state: under the communist systems, they may not have had freedom or affluence, but they did have basic economic security. The current reforms promise to deliver the former but threaten the latter.
Our survey asked three questions on the role of the government in the economy: whether the government should 1) guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living, 2) place upper limits on income and 3) provide a job for everyone who wants one. On all three questions, there was affirmative response in all of the postcommunist countries;
9. In another survey in which people in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia were asked what sort of society they would like their country to emulate, the majority named Germany or Sweden. The US ranked third, with an average of 18% (Richard Rose, "Toward a Civil Economy," Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2 [April 1992]: 16). Questions: Five point agree/disagree scale on following statements: 1) the government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living; 2) the government should place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone person may make; 3) the government should provide a job for everyone who ,wants one. * The statism index is the mean score on these three questions, at the individual level, averaged by country. Countries are ranked by support for these statist principles.
and for the issues of guaranteed jobs and standard of living, it was almost universal (see table 3 ). As is evident from the table, there was substantial support for these principles from the capitalist countries as well. But respondents in the east European countries were, overall, much more supportive of this strong government role than were those in the western countries. Americans, it should be noted, were much less supportive of strong government than any other country in this sample. On all three orientations, equality, need and role of the state, east central Europeans generally lean toward a more egalitarian and statist system than do those in west Europe, Japan or the US. To make more systematic cross-national comparisons and to allow a more systematic examination of the determinants of these attitudes, a single summary measure of pro·socialist orientations was derived from six attitudinal questions from the survey, including the questions discussed above. Socialist Principles Index
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Note: Highest numbers indicate strongest support for socialist principles. Index is based on the average of z·scores of responses on six questions tapping support for socialist principles (all 4· or 5·point Likert scales): -level of pay for an employee should be based on "the size of the family the employee supports" -"the government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living" -"the government should place an upper limit on the amount of money anyone person may make" -"the government should provide ajob for everyone who wants one" -"the fairest way of distributing wealth and income would be to give everyone equal shares" -"the most important thing is that people get what they need, even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need" Pairwise differences of .13 or more are significant at the .01 level (Scheffe criterion).
The average scores on this index, by country, are indicated in figure l. The absolute value of this index is not in itself very meaningful. What is notable here is the ranking of the countries. As before, the postcommunist countries score higher in socialist orientations than do and some of them 4·point) and then subtracting that number from 1 in order to make high numbers indicate positive support for socialist principles. The items on this scale were entered into a principle components factor analysis and all items were found to load on only one factor, providing evidence of a unidimensional scale. Using the SPSS "reliability" procedure, the items in the index produced a reliability coefficient (Cron· bach's Alpha) of .63.
It should be noted that this "socialist principles" index does not include variables tapping support for state ownership of property or industry, an important component of socialism. While such questions were originally included in pretest versions of our questionnaire and were asked in some of our countries, they were excluded from the common core of questions in the cross·national survey. Thus, this index taps sentiment toward important elements of socialism but does not include all dimensions of that concept. the capitalist countries;ll the only exception to this division is Japan, which is closer to the postcommunist states than to the western capitalist ones. On this scale, as on others mentioned above, the US is a distant outlier. Values and attitudes in the east European countries are much closer to those in west Europe (especially Germany) and Japan than they are to those in the US. In that case, the west European and Japanese models of economic and social development, involving a greater emphasis on community and government activism, might be more appropriate for postcommunist states than the more individualistic and laissez-faire approach in the US. 12 So far I have discussed only national averages of attitudes towards issues relevant to economic reforms. But in assessing the likely success of market-oriented reforms in east central Europe, it is necessary to consider who it is that supports and opposes these reforms. It would be helpful for market-oriented governments, of course, if a majority of the population supported the kinds of policies they are implementing. As we have seen above, however, that is not likely to be the case: most people in the postcommunist states still have a basically egalitarian and statist orientation that works against the laissez-faire and decentralizing reforms being implemented in the region. But even in the absence of a consensus behind the reforms, the governments might be able to push through the reforms if the proponents of the reforms were to remain politically active and the opponents were not.
In all of the east European countries except Estonia, the strongest determinant by far of pro-socialist attitudes is education (see table 4 ). In most countries, income and sex are the next most important. Those with low education and incomes, and women are more supportive of socialist principles than others. Figure 2 shows a. steady decline in support for socialist principles from those with low education to those with higher educations. Across all the east European countries, the correlation coefficient between the socialism index and educational level is -.33.
The strong negative relationship between education and support for socialism is not surprising and, in fact, prevails in the western countries as well (r=-.19 ). In the postcommunist countries, however, it is particularly strong and reflects a real and perplexing division within those societies. The governments there are pursuing non-egalitarian reforms and are supported in that effort by the more highly educated minority in those societies, who, as it happens, also have the 11. These differences are significant at the .01 level (Scheffe criterion) for most pairs of capitalist/postcommunist states. See the note to figure 1.
12. Similarly, James Gibson reports from a 1992 survey in the former Soviet Union that "the sort of market supported by most Soviet people is a far more benign and controlled market than is often thought of in the West (especially in the United States)" ("Political and Economic Markets: Connecting Attitudes toward Political Democracy and a Market Economy Within the Mass Culture of the USSR," paper presented at the 1993 annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Honolulu, 40). most to gain from such reforms. Indeed, in many of these countries, the new governments are dominated by the highly educated, because the revolutioris swept into power intellectuals who had previously opposed the communist system. In the east European countries as elsewhere, education is related to income, so support for socialist principles is also related to income (r= -.23). In Poland, for example, 58 percent of those in the bottom quartile of family incomes score high in support for socialist principles, while among those in the upper quartile, only 24 percent do.
Thus we see what could be a politically dangerous situation in the postcommunist countries: governments and relatively small educated elites favor implementation of market-based economies and more meritocratic societies, while most of the poor and less educated populations, who will most directly feel the bite of these reforms, remain supportive of many of the social and economic principles of the old regimes. While other studies have shown that most people in postcommunist countries are committed to the democratic aspects of the reform process, there are sharp divisions over the economic ones. 13 
Economic Values and Political Participation
It may seem paradoxical that there should be such divisions between leaders and led in societies that have just undergone paroxysms 13. In his 1992 survey in the former Soviet Union, Gibson also found stronger support for a democratic culture than for a market·based economic one ("Political And Economic Markets"). For evidence of support for democratic principles, see also Finifter and Mickiewicz; and Rose and Haerpfer. of revolution, participation and democratization. In East Germany, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere, hundreds of thousands of people par· ticipated in demonstrations that brought down the communist govern· ments and voter turnout was high in the first competitive elections in each of these countries. But on closer examination, it is clear that political activity in east European countries remained limited, even during the revolutionary ferment. Most people in all countries voted in the early elections but were not otherwise active politically in even a minimal way. Our survey asked respondents if they had ever participated in any of ten variants of political action, ranging from writing to a newspaper or signing a petition to joining a wildcat strike or blocking traffic (all questions used in the Political Action study).14 Table  5 shows wide variation across countries, with the incidence of protest high in those countries where the governments were brought down by people power (East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria) and low where Questions: ... have you ever done any of these things over an issue that was important to you: signed a petition; joined a boycott; attended a protest demonstration or rally; attended a public meeting; joined in an unofficial (wildcat) strike; blocked traffic; written to a newspaper; written to your (member of the national/federal legislature); refused to pay rent, rates or taxes; occupied a building or property in protest. Note: all percentages are rounded.
the transition was more evolutionary (Poland) or managed by the political elite (Hungary). But what is remarkable here is the lack of political activity of any kind in most of these countries: in the pooled sample, 58 percent of those in the postcommunist states had participated in none of ten forms of political action, compared with just 25 percent reporting such low levels of political activity in the capitalist states. 15 These questions asked about such activity over lifetimes, so it is apparent that these people were politically inactive both in the communist era, when the regimes encouraged formal political participation, and in the revolutionary era, when thousands of people took to the streets in demonstrations, protests and rallies. In all of the postcommunist states, most people (three quarters or more) voted in the first free or semi-free parliamentary elections in 1989-1991 but, apart from that, there was very little political activity. In most of the postcommunist states, less than a third of the respondents expressed even minimal political interest through "sympathizing with a particular [political] party." Only in eastern Germany, which had by this time been integrated into the fully formed political structure of the west, did a majority of respondents (53%) express such affiliation. In part, this reluctance to identify with political parties was due to the weak structure and development of party systems throughout the region. In both Poland and Hungary, for example, there were dozens of political parties and groups vying for parliamentary office, including the semi-serious Beer Lovers Party in Poland. This may have been bewildering to many potential voters, but the lack of effective party organizations effectively excluded much of the population from political participation and influence.
In the US and other western countries, socio-economic status, and especially education, is the most important determinant of voting and other forms of political participation. 16 In the postcommunist states, our survey also showed a linear relationship between educational level and both voting and political activity. In the capitalist countries in our survey, regression analysis showed education to be by far the most important determinant of political action (see table 6 ). In the postcommunist states, education was also important but the major determinant of political action was past personal experience of political injustice.
The variable "experienced injustice for political beliefs" (table 6 ) is derived from a series of questions in our survey about injustice in people's lives and asked respondents "how often have you personally experienced injustice because of the following factors," including "your political beliefs." Questions about injustice "in their lives" should have tapped past experiences (i.e., during the communist period) as well as present-day ones. In each of the postcommunist states, two thirds or 15. The Political Action study found similarly low levels of political inactivity in five western countries (Barnes and Kaase, 550 + Overall experience of injustice is the mean score on a series of eight questions asking if respondents had ever experienced injustice because of their religious beliefs, sex, social background, age, lack of money, part of country they were from, political beliefs, or race or ethnic group_ more said they had "rarely" or "never" experienced political injustice. But as is evident from Table 6 , such experience was an important determinant of political action in postcommunist states: overall almost two thirds of those who had experienced injustice were highly politically active, compared to about one third of those who had not experienced injustice. This relationship worked in the other direction as well, in that the politically active were much more likely to have experienced injustice than the politically inactive (40% compared to 17%). Thus, the relatively small proportion of the population that felt politically persecuted were disproportionately active in politics. The vast majority of the populations in postcommunist states, on the other hand, were more concerned with economic issues and economic injustice than with politics, and were not so politically activeP Political participation translates into political influence. Studies in the US and other western countries have shown that the economically advantaged groups in society tend to be more politically active and that the well-off therefore "tend to benefit more from governmental policies because they have greater influence on such policies_" 18 In the emerging democracies of eastern Europe, it is also the case that political participation is disproportionately exercised by those in higher socio-economic categories and by those who have experienced political injustice more than economic deprivation_ Perhaps this is not surprising in that the revolutions of 1989 (like most revolutions) were led by intellectuals and other dissidents who were the main targets of political repression under communism_ But if these are also the people who are leading the political and economic transitions in these societies, as seems to be the case, their interests, needs and political !lgendas are likely to be quite different from those of the populations as a whole_ What Sidney Verba and his colleagues say about the US also has relevance in the emerging democracies of eastern Europe: "If those who take part and those who do not were similar on all politically relevant dimensions, then substantial inequalities in participation would pose no threat to the democratic principles of equal protection of interests_ As our analysis has demonstrated, this is hardly the case_" 19 While studies of the US by Verba and others have found significant demographic differences between those who are politically active and those who are not, they have usually found minimal differences in the political attitudes of the two groups_ In the postcommunist states, on the other hand, the demographic differences are reinforced by significant attitudinal differences in areas important in the transitions_ Those people who were more active, for example, tended to be less supportive of socialist principles_ In every east European country, the level of support for socialist principles declined as the level of political activity increased (see figure 3 ) and, correspondingly, those high on our socialist principles index were much less likely (33%) to be politically active than those low on the index (54%)_20 This supports the evidence above that the more politically active and involved were more committed to market-oriented reforms than the less active, and less supportive of socialism and socialist principles_ 21 19. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie, 314. 20. The same relationship holds for the direct question on support for socialism, "based on your experience in [country name] of socialism." The percentage of those somewhat or totally against socialism rises from 39% of those with no political activity to 51 % of those with minimal activity to 62% of those reporting substantial activity (4 or more types of political action).
21. While the present study compares the values of the politically active with the politically inactive, Arthur Miller and his colleagues compared the values of political elites with those of the general population (in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania) and found marked differences in the levels of support for the market between the two groups ("Comparing Citizen and Elite Attitudes").
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is.. The political action measure used above refers to all past political behavior but may not necessarily reflect current political behavior in the more normal environment of democratic politics. The findings above, however, are confirmed when one looks at voting behavior in the early postcommunist elections. Our survey asked respondents if they had voted in the last national or parliamentary elections, most of which took place in 1990 or 1991. In the postcommunist states as a whole, the overwhelming majority (83 %) did vote in those elections. But those who were low on our socialist principles index were significantly22 more likely to have voted (86%) than those who scored high on that index (80 % ).23 Again, this attitudinal difference between voters and non·voters is different from patterns in the western coun· tries: in our pooled sample of capitalist countries, there was virtually no difference in voting behavior between those high and low on the socialist principles index.
In some countries at least, the political withdrawal of pro· socialist voters seems to have grown after 1991. The Polish General Social Sur· 22. Chi square (2 degrees of freedom) = 23.8; P < .00l.
23. Those identified as "high" on the socialist principles index were those in the top third of that index and those "low" were in the bottom third. Some postcommunist states had a significantly higher cleavage on this dimension than others. As indicated in the text, in the pooled sample of postcommunist states, the difference in voting behavior between those high and low on the index was 5.6 percentage points (86.1 %-80.5%). The individual country differences were as follows: Hungary, 6.9%; Poland, 6.2%; eastern Germany, 4.3%; Russia, 0.5%; Czechoslovakia, 0.2%. The countries with the higher figures are likely to experience more political divisions and instability. vey,24 for example, asked respondents if they had voted in the parliamentary elections of October 1991 (which occurred after our survey). There was, of course, a dramatic decline in voter turnout from the 1989 elections. But there was a much steeper decline among those who declared themselves "in favor" of socialism, a question that was also asked in the 1991 survey. As is apparent from table 7, there was only a four percentage point differential in voting between those strongly in favor of socialism and those totally against socialism in 1991. In the 1992 survey, this difference had widened to almost 17 percentage points.
The political withdrawal of pro-socialist voters contained both good news and bad news for the reforming governments in eastern Europe. The good news was that the people opposed to or skeptical about market-oriented reforms were not likely to express this opposition in political action. There was a kind of "silent majority" in the postcommunist countries of people who were not committed to the reforms but would not speak out or vote against them, thus allowing the reformist governments to pursue the difficult transitional policies without substantial opposition. At first, there were few political parties or organizations in the east European countries which attempted to mobilize this potential opposition. In part this was due to lingering resentment of the communists and a popular suspicion that organized groups that opposed the liberalizing reforms must themselves be communists. Indeed, there were communist or proto-communist groups or parties in each of these countries in 1991, but these were quite small and were not always any more pro-socialist than the rest of the population. In all three countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Slovenia) where our survey asked about former communist party membership, support for socialist principles was lower among those reporting such membership than among those who said they had never belonged to the communist parties. Here, as has been shown by other indicators, potential oppo, sition to liberalizing reforms is much broader and deeper in the population than is support for hardline groups.
The bad news for the reforming governments was the possibility that opposition to reforms might become mobilized and politically active. Silent majorities could safely be ignored as long as they remained silent. But if the transitional period becomes too painful or too long, skepticism about the principles of reform will be reinforced by very real economic hardship. The combination of these circumstances could very well lead to popular upheaval (e.g. strikes or demonstrations) or simply to electoral defeat for the reforming governments and the accession to power of governments committed to reversing the tide of marketization or even of democratization. We have seen hints of this outcome already with the strong showing of newly revived postcommunist parties in Lithuania, Poland and Hungary, and of antidemocratic forces in Russia.
Reshaping Culture and Ideology
The evidence above points to some of the social and political obstacles to the transition to market democracies in east central Europe. It is unlikely that the governments of the region will be able to work against this political culture; either the governments or the culture will have to change. Given the overwhelming consensus among both the postcommunist political elites and western financial institutions that they should push ahead with reforms, the governments will not lightly change their market-oriented strategies. What they need to do, in that case, is to work on reshaping popular values and political culture. As Kent Jennings points out, "if we want to change perceptions of unfairness, one fundamental route is to change value systems first-no small task." 25 This is normally the task of the political socialization process, which often takes a generation or more to effect substantial changes in values or culture. But the political culture in eastern Europe seems particularly fluid and malleable in this transitional period, so perhaps these governments will be able to quickly bring the populations around to their point of view. 26 There are those who argue that changes in popular orientations are already beginning to take place and that a shift in favor of the market and capitalism will accelerate as the economic reforms begin to improve the economies and deliver jobs, wealth and consumer goods. Indeed, most of the postcommunist states show some shifts away from the radical egalitarianism and hostility to private enterprise that char· acterized the communist and early postcommunist period. As we have seen, however, in 1991, two years after the revolutions in most cases, attitudes remained much more egalitarian and statist than in the west· ern countries. And in the few cases where questionnaire items from our 1991 survey have been replicated subsequently, there does not appear to be much overall change in attitudes on key economic and political issues.
In Poland, for example, a survey conducted in mid·1992 and again in mid·1993 included a number of questions asked in the 1991 survey.27 This period was one in which industrial production was beginning to recover for the first time since the introduction of shock therapy in January 1990 and inflation was beginning to moderate-though un· employment was continuing to grow. In this context, one sees a sur· prising change in the response to our question (reported in table 1) about views about socialism (see table 8 ). One sees a slight increase both in those in favor of socialism and those "somewhat against" it. But there is a marked decline in those "totally against" socialism as well as an increase in the ambivalent responses of "neither for nor against" or "don't know." As noted in our discussion above, "socialism" is an ideologically loaded term that evokes hostility from many survi· vors of the communist years. But in Poland, at least, much of that visceral hostility ("totally against") seems to have evaporated within a remarkably short period of time. In this respect, at least, capitalism seems not to have won over many adherents, even as it was starting to generate some successes. Surveys, 1992 Surveys, -1993 On other questions, too, one sees growing concern with the effects of the economic reforms. One question asked in the 1991 survey and repeated in Poland in 1992 asked about "differences in people's incomes in Poland." In 1991 44 percent thought such differences were "much too large" and 17 percent thought they were somewhat or much too small. In 1992 these figures were 52 percent and 8 percent, respectively, showing substantial increases in those concerned about the growing gap between wealthy and poor in Poland. In the 1991 survey we had also asked respondents about the role of government in the economy, including whether the government should provide a job for everyone who wanted one. As seen in table 3, there was overwhelming support for this proposition throughout eastern Europe, including 88 percent of the respondents in Poland. In 1992 the level of overall support in Poland for this same proposition was almost identical (89%), though there was a substantial dro~ in those who strongly agreed with that statement (from 66% to 49%). 8 Poland was the first country in the region to introduce economic "shock therapy" and was the first to begin to recover from the traumas of the initial shock. In some ways, then, Poland is a harbinger of the course of the transition in many of the other postcommunist states. As we have seen, though, attitudes in the country remain egalitarian and statist, with much of the population concerned about, and affected by, the social and economic dislocations of economic transformation. By 1992, at least, there do not seem to have been major changes in the political culture that would indicate the population becoming more accepting of market-oriented changes than they had the previous year. The electoral victory of the left in September 1993 certainly reflects this continuing popular skepticism towards reforms. It also suggests that the "silent majority" on the left had begun to re-enter the political arena.
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Favored Futures in East Central Europe
As one might expect from the above analysis, citizens of postcommunist states are divided on what kind of future they favor for their countries. In every country but Czechoslovakia, the largest number in 1991 favored ."a more democratic type of socialism" than either the kind of socialism they had had before or a free-market economy (see table 9 ) but in no country did a majority favor any of the four choices presented. This is consistent with other surveys which have found that people in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia favored emulating German or Swedish society more than the US;29 it is also consistent with 28. There is a similar pattern in Hungary, with the 1992 ISSP survey showing three quarters of the population still agreeing with this proposition, but a much smaller percentage (50%, compared to 80% in 1991) strongly agreeing.
29. Richard Rose, "Toward a Civil Economy," Journal of Democracy 3 no. 2 (April 1992): 13-26. Questionnaire item: There are many views about the future development of (country name, e.g. Polish) society. Which one of these alternatives comes closest to your own preference? 1) a socialist society along the lines of what we have already experienced in (country); 2) a more democratic type of socialism as found in some countries in the west; 3) a free· market economy which is essentially non·socialist as found in some other countries in the west; 4) a specific (country name, e.g. Polish) solution unique to the country. many of our findings that attitudes toward the economy and the role of the state in east central Europe were closer to those in western Europe and Japan than to the US. As we found earlier with the sources of support and opposition to socialist principles, the politically active segments of the population are much more supportive of a free-market future than the inactive_ Across all of the postcommunist states, a free-market solution was favored by 43 percent of the most politically active (4 or more types of political action), compared to just 25 percent of the large majority of respondents reporting no political actions_ In this latter group, by far the largest number (39%) favored a democratic socialist solution, followed by 28 percent favoring a uniquely national solution_ It is also clear from our survey that young people provide the primary source of support for a free-market solution across postcommunist states_ Support for a free-market solution declines steadily from 36 percent of those under 27 years of age to just 21 percent of those over 65, and this pattern holds for each of the countries individually as welL It is understandable that young people, more risk-taking, individualistic and westernized, would be more attracted to a free-market system that promised wealth to the ambitious and prosperity to the nation_ It is also understandable, however, that older people, more dependent on the state and more concerned about present-day economic security than future riches, would be more reluctant to abandon totally the system of guarantees and benefits provided by the state_ The age differences on these issues raises the possibility of conflict between the generations on the future of these countries, with older people favoring a commitment.to some kind of socialism and the young pressing for a more thoroughgoing market economy. On the other hand, it raises the possibility that, over time, an increasingly larger segment of the population will be brought over to the market alter· native, as older generations are replaced by younger, both in the so~ cieties at large and in the leaderships. The fact that the current lead· ership in these countries is rather young and that the politically active are more committed to the market means that in the short run, at least, the market approach will predominate. The question is, will this pre· dominance prevail as older segments of the population re·enter the political arena and as the toll of the market erodes support for capi· talism even among the young.
In some countries, this turnaround seems to have begun already, with the electoral victories of postcommunist parties in Lithuania, Po· land and Hungary, for example. In the September 1993 elections in Poland, the victory of the parties on the left was due in part to the return to the electorate of people who had not voted in earlier elections. Of those who had not voted before, some 47 percent cast th~ir vote this time for parties on the left (22% for the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance], 15% for the PSL [Peasant Party] and 10% for the UP [Union of Labor]).30 This seems to confirm my assumptions in this paper that 1) those on the left (i.e., supporters of socialist principles) have not heretofore been very active politically; and 2) that when they re-enter the political arena, it is likely to result in different political constellations that may slow the pace of marketization and privatization. In Poland, at least, the new governing alliance (of the SLD and PSL) promised to stay the course of economic reform, but the election results did send a signal of popular concern with the reform process that is bound to have an impact. This may be bad news for reformers and particularly those who favor a rapid transition to the market. But it is good news for the development and maturation of democratic institutions and values in the postcommunist states. For, without the inclusion of all segments of east central European populations in the political process, including those who are skeptical about the market and about capitalism, democracy will not succeed.
